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CASENOTES
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services:
The Right to Counsel in Parental
Termination Proceedings
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that due process mandates only a
case-by-case analysis for determining when a court should ap-
point counsel for an indigent parent in an action to terminate
parental rights. The author analyzes Lassiter in relation to the
historical development of an indigent's right to counsel in crimi-
nal and civil proceedings. The author argues that a case-by-case
analysis is unlikely to afford adequate protection for a parent's
right to child custody and is also inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's previous decisions establishing an absolute right to coun-
sel in criminal prosecutions.
In 1975 the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina,
removed an infant, William Lassiter, from the custody of his
mother, Abby Gail Lassiter, because she had not provided him
with proper medical care. The following year, Ms. Lassiter began
serving a prison sentence for second-degree murder. In 1978 the
Durham County Department of Social Services, to whose custody
the court had transferred the child, petitioned the court to termi-
nate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights. The Department alleged that
Ms. Lassiter had not maintained contact with William since 1975,
had not made significant progress toward correcting the conditions
that led to his removal, and had failed to assist the Department in
its efforts to improve her relationship with the child and plan for
his future.
The court initiated the termination hearing by considering
whether Ms. Lassiter should have more time to retain an attorney.
Concluding that Ms. Lassiter had already had ample time to seek
counsel, the court refused to delay the proceedings. The state had
arranged for her to attend the hearing, where, acting pro se, she
cross-examined the state's only witness, a social worker from the
Department of Social Services, and testified in her own defense.
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The court terminated Ms. Lassiter's status as William's parent
after finding that she had willfully neglected her child.
Ms. Lassiter appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
arguing for the first time that the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause1 entitled her to the assistance of appointed counsel
because she was indigent.' The trial court, she claimed, had thus
erred in failing to provide her with an attorney. The appellate
court held that although a parental termination proceeding in-
vaded the constitutionally protected area of individual privacy, the
intrusion was not sufficiently unreasonable to require the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent parents3 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina subsequently denied Ms. Lassiter's petition for dis-
cretionary review.' She then appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, which granted certiorari to consider her due process
claim. The Supreme Court held, affirmed: The United States Con-
stitution does not mandate the appointment of counsel for indi-
gent parents in every parental termination proceeding, and the de-
termination of whether due process requires appointed counsel in a
particular case should be left to the trial court, subject to appellate
review. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18
(1981).
In both civil and criminal cases, the United States Supreme
Court has often considered the extent to which the Constitution
requires courts to appoint counsel for indigent litigants. The Court
established an indigent's right to counsel in criminal prosecutions
before it confirmed that an indigent may have a right to counsel in
a civil proceeding. This development is not surprising, for in con-
trast to most adverse civil judgments, criminal convictions fre-
quently affect a defendant's life and liberty. Furthermore, the ex-
treme disadvantage that an unrepresented indigent suffers in a
court proceeding is most apparent in a criminal trial.5 Fifty years
1. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979).
3. Id. at 527, 259 S.E.2d at 337.
4. In re Lassiter, 299 N.C. 120, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
5. An indigent litigant is particularly disadvantaged if he lacks the education and so-
phistication needed to under.1 .,nd the law and proceedings. The Supreme Court also has
recognized that even a well-educated layman can be disadvantaged by a lack of counsel:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law .... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have (sic] a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
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ago, in Powell v. Alabama," the Court held that an indigent defen-
dant, prosecuted for a capital offense in a state court, had a consti-
tutional right to appointed counsel. But in Betts v. Brady, the
Court declined the opportunity to extend this right to crimes that
were not punishable by death. The Betts Court held that due pro-
cess did not require state courts to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant in every criminal prosecution; rather, courts should de-
termine when counsel is necessary to ensure a fair trial based on
the facts of each case."
In the forty years since Betts, the Supreme Court has rejected
this case-by-case approach and has established an absolute right to
counsel in most criminal prosecutions. In Gideon v. Wainwright,'
the Court overruled Betts and held that the sixth amendment's
guarantee of counsel in criminal prosecutions 0 was a fundamental
right made binding on the states by the fourteenth amendment."
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,1 the Court further extended this right,
holding that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."8 Relying on the explicit lan-
guage of the sixth amendment, the Court has also held that an
indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel not only at the
trial itself, but also at other stages of a criminal prosecution."
In contrast to an indigent's established right to counsel in
criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to es-
tablish an indigent's right to counsel in civil proceedings. There are
two reasons for this result. First, before a court can apply the four-
know how to establish his innocence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Powell Court reasoned that the inability of most laymen to
understand and present even a simple defense makes a meaningful hearing impossible when
conducted without legal assistance. A conviction under these circumstances could therefore
be a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Id. at 69.
7. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8. Id. at 462.
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
11. 372 U.S. at 339.
12. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
13. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
14. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing to determine
whether to send a case to the grand jury); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (post-
indictment lineup); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (extending the right
to counsel to appeals of right). But cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to
counsel for discretionary appeals).
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teenth amendment's guarantee of due process in a civil proceeding,
it must find that an adverse decision may deprive the defendant of
a substantive right that is "fundamental" to the concept of life,
liberty, or property. 16 Second, a court can determine whether ap-
pointment of counsel is necessary to ensure procedural due process
only by balancing the defendant's rights against the state's interest
in refusing counsel. 16 To achieve "fundamental fairness" in the
proceedings, procedural due process requires that a defendant have
a "meaningful opportunity to be heard. 17 If a state does not ap-
point counsel when a defendant's fundamental rights are at
stake,18 the defendant may be denied a "meaningful opportunity to
be heard," violating procedural due process.19
Before Lassiter, several state courts and a few United States
courts of appeals had considered whether the Constitution re-
15. Due process protects only fundamental rights. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972) (due process applies only when the interest falls within the fourteenth
amendment's liberty and property protections). Deciding whether a particular interest is
fundamental requires a court to examine the type of interest involved, rather than its weight
or the seriousness of the loss. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975) (public school
suspension conducted without hearing); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71
(1972) (requirements of due process depend on the type of interest).
16. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374 (5th
Cir. 1980), aff'd in part, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en banc).
17. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-88 (1973).
18. A parent's right to the care, upbringing, and custody of children is implicit in the
fourteenth amendment's concept of liberty. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
(1952); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399, 401 (1923). Meyer interpreted the term "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment as
"not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to... marry,
establish a home and bring up children . . . ." Id. at 399.
19. In a case mentioned in Lassiter only by the dissent, 452 U.S. at 58-59 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting), the Supreme Court acknowledged that unobstructed access to a court is es-
sential to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
In Boddie the Court held that a state violated due process by denying an indigent access to
a divorce court solely because of the indigent's inability to pay court filing fees. Id. at 382-
83. Because divorce courts are the only available avenue for marital dissolutions, the Court
reasoned that a state may not limit an indigent's access to its divorce courts by erecting
financial barriers. The state's interest in collecting filing fees does not outweigh the indi-
gent's right to obtain a divorce. Id. at 381.
Although many analogies can be drawn between Boddie and Lassiter, the Lassiter
Court refused to extend Boddie to guarantee an indigent a right to counsel in a parental
termination proceeding. Indeed, the Boddie Court restricted its holding to the facts of the
case. 401 U.S. at 382. Additionally, more recent Supreme Court decisions have limited Bod-
die's significance. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (due process does not
invalidate bankruptcy filing fees, because bankruptcy is not a fundamental right nor the
only means of erasing debts); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) (due




quired a state to provide counsel .for an indigent parent when it
initiated an action to acquire custody of a child.20 - Courts generally
conduct two distinct proceedings that can affect a parent's right to
child custody: 1) "dependency" proceedings 1 and 2) "termination"
proceedings."2 In a dependency proceeding, the state seeks to as-
sume temporary custody of an abandoned, neglected, truant,
abused, or delinquent child. 8 Such an adjudication usually results
in the parent losing some rights to the care and custody of a child,
but rarely terminates the entire parent-child relationship.'4 In con-
trast to dependency proceedings, when a state initiates a termina-
tion proceeding, it is seeking a total and permanent severance of
the parent-child relationship. 5 The parent loses all rights to visit
or communicate with the child, and also loses the right to partici-
pate in, or even know about any subsequent decisions affecting the
child's life.'
Some courts distinguish between these two proceedings and
appoint counsel for indigent parents only in termination proceed-
ings." The Lassiter Court noted this distinction and implied that
in deciding whether to appoint counsel, courts should consider the
severe deprivation that may result from a termination.28 Because
termination proceedings are more intrusive than dependency pro-
ceedings, an indigent's right to appointed counsel, if the right ex-
20. The Lassiter Court noted that courts have generally held that a state must provide
appointed counsel for parents at termination proceedings. 452 U.S. at 30; e.g., State ex rel.
Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66 (1980); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983 (Okla.
1978). The majority also observed that some courts have held that a right to counsel also
exists in child dependency or neglect proceedings. 452 U.S. at 30 n.6; e.g., Davis v. Page, 618
F.2d 374, 386 (5th Cir. 1980), afrd in part, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en banc);
Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940, 945 (1974) (case-by-case determination).
21. Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to
State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 Gzo. L.J. 213, 225 (1979). Some courts
refer to these actions as "neglect" proceedings. Id.
22. Id. at 230.
23. Id. at 225.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 230.
26. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
27. See, e.g., In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980). In this decision the Supreme Court
of Florida held that courts should appoint counsel only when parental rights are perma-
nently terminated or when a parent could face criminal charges arising from the case. If no
permanent termination is likely, a court should decide whether to appoint counsel on a case-
by-case basis. Id. at 91. The court observed that the "extent of procedural due process pro-
tections varies with the character of the interest and the nature of the proceeding involved."
Id. at 89 (citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
28. 452 U.S. at 30.
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ists, is more likely to apply in termination rather than dependency
proceedings.
Other courts have avoided the distinction between termination
and dependency proceedings in determining an indigent parent's
right to appointed counsel, and instead focus on the extent of cus-
tody loss, rather than the type of proceeding. In Cleaver v. Wil-
cox,29 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit adopted a case-by-case analysis for determining
when an indigent had a right to counsel in dependency proceed-
ings. 0 The Cleaver analysis requires a court to weigh three impor-
tant interests: 1) society's interest in maintaining family integrity;
2) the state's interest in efficient and informal dependency pro-
ceedings; and 3) the parent's interest in avoiding an erroneous loss
of child custody. 1 In weighing the parent's interests, the Cleaver
court suggested that a trial judge should consider the length of the
potential loss of custody, the presence or absence of parental con-
sent to the separation, the existence of disputed facts, and the par-
ent's ability to understand the complexities of the proceedings
without the assistance of counsel.3'
More recently, however, in Davis v. Page,88 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Cleaver's case-by-
case approach and held that indigent parents have an absolute
right to counsel in all dependency hearings." Because even a tem-
porary loss of custody could become effectively permanent by con-
tinuing until the child reached majority, 5 the Davis court reasoned
that a state's intrusion into family integrity is always sufficient to
require the appointment of counsel.
In evaluating the need for counsel, the Davis court applied the
balancing test for assessing the requirements of due process formu-
lated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mathews v.
Eldridge." This test requires a court to weigh three factors that
29. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 944. The Cleaver court recognized that a parent's relationship with his or her
child is a "fundamental" interest, but nevertheless held that the "requisites of due process
vary according to specific factual contexts." Id.
31. Id. at 944-45.
32. Id. at 945.
33. 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd in part, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (rehearing
en banc).
34. Id. at 386.
35. Id. at 376.
36. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge involved the question whether due process requires a




are similar to those established by the Ninth Circuit in Cleaver.
The Eldridge factors are: 1) the private interest that the official
action affects; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this inter-
est and the value of additional or alternative procedural safe-
guards; and 3) the government's interests, including the nature of
the government function and the extent to which additional or al-
ternative safeguards may impose a financial or administrative bur-
den on the government.8 7 Justice Stewart, writing for the Lassiter
majority, also relied on the Eldridge factors, but in contrast to the
Davis court, he concluded that due process did not mandate an
absolute right to counsel.38
Lassiter is significant for several reasons. First, the Court re-
solved a conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.3 Second,
the Court confronted the trend among state courts toward finding
that indigent parents have a constitutional right to appointed
counsel in dependency and termination hearings.4 0  Third,
Lassiter's case-by-case approach established a precedent that dis-
courages courts from extending an absolute right to counsel to
other civil cases in which a litigant's physical liberty is not at
stake.41
The Lassiter Court reasoned that determining the right to
counsel through a case-by-case analysis was consistent with the
requisites of due process and the Court's previous decisions in
right-to-counsel cases. The majority set the tone for its analysis by
observing that "[f]or all its consequence, 'due process' has never
been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined." 42 Rather, the
due process requirement of fundamental fairness can only be de-
fined by assessing the interests at stake, particularly individual
physical liberty, and considering any relevant precedents. 43 Among
these precedents, the majority considered Gideon v. Wainwright44
and Argersinger v. Hamlin,45 which relied on the sixth and four-
37. Id. at 335.
38. 452 U.S. at 31.
39. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 20. The Lassiter majority noted that many authorities believe that a
court should appoint counsel to represent indigent parents in dependency and termination
proceedings. The majority acknowledged that providing an attorney for an indigent parent
may be a sound public policy, but concluded that the Constitution did not require such a
policy. 452 U.S. at 33-34.
41. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
42. 452 U.S. at 24.
43. Id.
44. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
45. 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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teenth amendments to establish an indigent defendant's right to
counsel in criminal prosecutions. The Lassiter majority reasoned
that the importance of protecting a defendant's physical liberty
necessitated an absolute right to counsel in both criminal and civil
litigations which jeopardize that liberty."
The majority found support for this assertion in several of the
Court's previous decisions. In Scott v. Illinois,"' the Court held
that the right to counsel does not arise in every criminal prosecu-
tion, but only to those in which a court imprisons a convicted de-
fendant.48 The Court has also established an indigent's right to
counsel in civil cases, where the sixth amendment is inapplicable.4'
In a 1960 decision, In re Gault,50 the Court upheld an indigent's
right to counsel in a juvenile delinquency proceeding solely on the
basis of the fourteenth amendment's due process protection of lib-
erty.5' The Gault Court noted that delinquency proceedings, al-
though denominated as "civil," can have a functionally "criminal"
impact because a juvenile court has the power to commit a delin-
quent child to an institution for several years. This penalty is com-
parable in severity to the sentence that a criminal court may im-
pose on a convicted felon.5" In determining a litigant's right to
appointed counsel, the civil-criminal distinction thus becomes use-
less, and liberty becomes the important consideration.5
As a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does
his right to appointed counsel.54 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,55 the
Court adopted a case-by-case approach for determining the right
46. 452 U.S. at 25.
47. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
48. Id. at 373-74. The trial court convicted Scott of shoplifting and fined him fifty dol-
lars. Although the trial judge could have sentenced Scott to one year in prison for this of-
fense, the Supreme Court reasoned that the mere possibility of imprisonment was insuffi-
cient to invoke the right to counsel. Rather, the Court adopted "actual imprisonment as the
line defining the constitutional right to the appointment of counsel." Id. at 373.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
50. 387 US. 1 (1967).
51. Id. at 41; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
52. 387 U.S. at 36. Gault emphasized that the "awesome prospect of incarceration"
confronts both a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding and an adult in a criminal proceeding.
Id.
53. Id. at 49-50. Some jurisdictions have, however, relied on the civil-criminal distinc-
tion in refusing to recognize a right to counsel in termination proceedings. See Comment,
Appointment of Counsel Is Required for Indigent Parents Faced with a Dependency-Ne-
glect Proceeding, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 623, 633 n.70 (1975). But a majority of states statutorily
require appointed counsel for indigent parents at termination proceedings. See 46 TENN. L.
REV. 649, 651 n.10 (1979).
54. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26.
55. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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to counsel in probation revocation hearings. The Gagnon Court
reasoned that revocation did not deprive a probationer of an unfet-
tered right to liberty, but only a liberty dependent on the obser-
vance of special restrictions. The Court therefore limited the right
to counsel to hearings in which the issues are too complex for a
layman to understand, or to those in which the probationer is inca-
pable of speaking for himself.5 6
From these precedents the Lassiter majority derived a pre-
sumption that fundamental fairness requires a court to appoint
counsel for an indigent litigant "only when, if he loses, he may be
deprived of his physical liberty."" A court must, therefore, weigh
the factors in a due process analysis against this presumption when
determining whether to appoint counsel in a proceeding that does
not threaten a litigant's freedom. For this analysis the Lassiter
majority adopted the three Eldridge factors: the private interest,
the risk of error, and the government's interest.58
The Constitution protects a parent's right to the care, up-
bringing, and custody of children from unreasonable governmental
interference.5 This is particularly true when a state is not simply
infringing on the right, but seeking to terminate it. Because a ter-
mination proceeding may result in a "unique kind of depriva-
tion,"60 the Lassiter majority reasoned that parents have a "com-
manding" interest in an accurate and just decision. 1
The risk of error varies with the complexity of the proceed-
ings. Although a parent is undoubtedly familiar with the subject of
a termination hearing, these hearings often present difficult legal
issues which a court must resolve. The majority reasoned that the
expert medical and psychiatric testimony presented at these hear-
ings, the parent's lack of education, and the stressful atmosphere
of the hearing may combine to "overwhelm an uncounseled
parent.
' '12
The state has two conflicting interests in a termination pro-
ceeding: justice and efficiency. The state is concerned with protect-
ing the child's welfare and therefore shares the parent's desire for
56. Id. at 790-91.
57. 452 U.S. at 27.
58. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 18.
60. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
61. Id. Some parents may have an additional interest, because petitions to terminate
parental rights often allege criminal conduct. These parents may need an attorney to help
them understand the problems that these allegations may create. Id. at 27 n.3.
62. Id. at 30.
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a just decision. The state might best serve this interest by ap-
pointing counsel for the parent. But the state also has an interest
in informal, efficient, and inexpensive termination proceedings, an
interest that might be thwarted by appointing counsel." Although
this interest is legitimate, the majority reasoned that it could not
overcome the parent's right to receive a fair hearing."
Although the Eldridge factors appear to favor a requirement
that courts appoint counsel for indigent parents, the Lassiter ma-
jority stated that the dispositive question was whether these fac-
tors outweighed the presumption that a defendant has no right to
appointed counsel absent a threat to his physical liberty. 6 The
majority conceded that due process might require a court to ap-
point counsel when the parent's interests and the risk of error were
strong and the state's interest in refusing counsel was weak. The
Eldridge factors will not, however, always be distributed in this
manner. Accordingly, the majority left the decision whether to ap-
point counsel to the trial courts, subject only to appellate review. 7
The majority then reviewed the record from Ms. Lassiter's termi-
nation hearing and held that the trial court did not err in failing to
appoint counsel.
As Justice Blackmun demonstrated in his dissenting opinion,
the majority's analysis is open to substantial criticism. Blackmun
rejected the presumption that indigent litigants have a right to ap-
pointed counsel only in proceedings that threaten their physical
freedom; he argued that the Court's previous decisions show that
incarceration is "neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
requiring counsel on behalf of an indigent defendant." 9 The
Court, for example, has not required counsel for parolees or proba-
tioners at revocation hearings, even though the hearings led to
63. Id. at 28. Our adversary system assumes that an equal presentation from both sides
in a legal proceeding is most likely to produce a just result. Thus, the desire to ensure an
accurate result may prompt the state to provide an attorney to represent an indigent parent.
See id.
64. Id. An attorney representing an indigent parent may thwart the state's desire for
efficiency and economy by prolonging termination proceedings and increasing their cost. Id.
65. Id. North Carolina conceded that the cost of providing indigent parents with an
attorney at termination hearings would be insignificant in comparison to the cost of provid-
ing attorneys for indigent criminal defendants. Id.
66. Id. at 31.
67. Id. In adopting a case-by-case approach, the Lassiter majority relied on Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), as precedent. See also supra notes 56-57.
68. 452 U.S. at 32-33. For a discussion of the majority's due process analysis of Ms.
Lassiter's termination hearing, see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
69. 452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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their incarceration."0 On the other hand, the Court has required
the appointment of counsel for an already incarcerated indigent
prisoner before the state could involuntarily transfer him from a
prison to a mental hospital.7 1 In the absence of this presumption,
the Court's case-by-case approach appears "illogical," because the
Eldridge factors always favor providing counsel for the parent in
termination proceedings. 2
Justice Blackmun argued further that the Court, in Gideon v.
Wainwright,78 had "thoroughly discredited"' the case-by-case ap-
proach for evaluating due process in criminal prosecutions by stat-
ing: "[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be as-
sured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 5 Blackmun
noted that in civil litigations the Court has adopted a more flexible
approach to due process analysis, but even in those cases the Court
has established the requirements of due process by assessing the
individual interest at stake and the nature of the proceeding,
rather than the facts of a particular case.7'
Lassiter appears to deviate from the Court's usual practice of
providing "a rule that has general application to similarly situated
cases."77 As Justice Blackmun observed, establishing rules that fit
the context of the litigation, rather than the characteristics of a
particular litigant, is essential in maintaining the predictability
and uniformity of procedural requirements. A case-by-case ap-
proach, which requires "a retrospective review of the trial record of
each particular defendant parent . . . undermines the very ratio-
70. Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972); supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun observed that
the informal nature of revocation hearings influenced the Gagnon Court in its decision that
due process required a case-by-case approach for determining the right to counsel in such
proceedings. At revocation hearings the state usually is not represented by an attorney and
the rules of evidence generally are not in force. 452 U.S. at 36.
71. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek the Court emphasized the different
forms of incarceration and the stigma that a prisoner might suffer from being confined in a
mental hospital. Id. at 492. The Court also reasoned that prisoners with mental problems
might be incapable of speaking for themselves. Id. at 496-97.
72. 452 U.S. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
74. 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 36 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
76. 452 U.S. at 36-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun observed that a ter-
mination hearing closely resembles a criminal trial: The hearing has an accusatory and puni-
tive focus; a judge presides over the hearing; a prosecuting attorney represents the state;
and the rules of evidence are in force. Id. at 37.
77. Id. at 49.
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nale on which this concept of general fairness is based. '7 8
In adopting a case-by-case approach, the Lassiter majority as-
sumed that appellate courts will be able to determine from the rec-
ord whether the lack of counsel subjected a parent to an unfair
disadvantage. This determination will require, however, appellate
courts to engage primarily in speculation, because the record will
not reveal the arguments an attorney might have made, but will
only demonstrate the parent's obvious blunders.79 Even if a mean-
ingful appellate review were possible, Justice Blackmun argued, it
would be cumbersome and expensive.80 Thus, Lassiter's flexible
standard for evaluating due process jeopardizes both the individ-
ual's interest in a just decision and the state's interest in pro-
cedural economy and efficiency.
As a comparison between the majority opinion and Justice
Blackmun's dissent illustrates, appeals based on a refusal to ap-
point counsel are likely to produce unpredictable and inconsistent
results. This is illustrated in Lassiter, because both the majority
and the dissent applied the Eldridge factors to Ms. Lassiter's case,
but arrived at opposite conclusions. In affirming the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals decision that due process did not require the
trial court to appoint counsel for Ms. Lassiter, the majority rea-
soned that the risk of error (the second Eldridge factor) was insub-
stantial. The majority noted that although North Carolina did not
provide an attorney for Ms. Lassiter, the state had established
other procedural safeguards. These included notice,81 a hearing,"
and an appeal.88 .In addition, the state required that a judgment
terminating parental rights must "be based on clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence."' The majority also observed that Ms.
Lassiter's hearing did not involve any complex issues, procedures,
or points of law. Despite Ms. Lassiter's concededly incomplete de-
fense, the majority concluded that the evidence against her was so
substantial that the presence of counsel would not have led to a
78. Id. at 50 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 28-29 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.27 (1981)).
82. Id. at 29 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.28 (1981)).
83. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.34 (1981)).
84. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30 (1981)). The Supreme Court has recently
held that due process requires a state to prove its allegations in a termination proceeding by
at least clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). For a




Justice Blackmun expressed a markedly different view of the
record. He stressed Ms. Lassiter's obvious legal blundering at the
hearing, including her failure to pursue available defenses,"" her
failure to object to damaging hearsay evidence,87 and her inability
to effectively cross-examine the state's only witness, a social
worker from the Department of Social Services."8 He argued that
these factors indicated that her hearing was far from "fundamen-
tally fair," and concluded: "[T]he Court simply ignores the defen-
dant's obvious inability to speak effectively for herself, a factor the
Court has found to be highly significant in past cases."89
Justice Blackmun's vastly different view of the record demon-
strates another problem with leaving the decision to appoint coun-
sel to the trial court's discretion. A trial court will have difficulty
predicting the issues and procedural problems that may arise at
the hearing.90 Because Lassiter does not provide any clear stan-
dard for evaluating the situation, the decision will vary from one
judge to another. And when a trial judge denies counsel for an in-
digent parent, the hearing is likely to be fraught with error. As
Justice Blackmun observed:
The risk of error thus is severalfold. The parent who actu-
ally has achieved the improvement or quality of parenting the
State would require may be unable to establish this fact. The
parent who has failed in these regards may be unable to demon-
strate cause, absence of willfulness, or lack of agency diligence as
justification. And errors of fact or law in the State's case may go
unchallenged and uncorrected."1
Lassiter's case-by-case approach is also likely to provoke a
85. Id. at 32-33.
86. For example, Ms. Lassiter could have argued effectively that her incarceration for
second-degree murder made it impossible for her to maintain contact with William or to
plan for his future. Id. at 52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 53. The social worker testified about events that had occurred before the
Department assigned her to Ms. Lassiter's case. She testified further that the Department's
records described these events, but the state neither introduced these records into evidence
nor made them available at the hearing.
88. Id. at 54. Ms. Lassiter attempted to cross-examine the social worker but, rather
than asking questions, used the opportunity to make statements.
89. Id. at 57; see, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1948).
90. 452 U.S. at 51 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A trial judge can decide whether
appointing counsel is necessary only by reviewing the evidence before the hearing takes
place. Id.
91. Id. at 46 (footnote omitted).
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multitude of appeals asserting that a trial court's decision denying
counsel in a termination proceeding violated the parent's constitu-
tional rights.9' In establishing a flexible approach for due process
analysis, the Lassiter majority reasoned that the Constitution
should establish only minimum standards, permitting the states to
regulate their own court procedures without excessive interference
from the federal government.9 3 Justice Blackmun argued that
Lassiter may achieve exactly the opposite effect. He noted that
post-verdict challenges after the Supreme Court, in Betts v.
Brady,9" decided that due process permitted a flexible, case-by-
case determination of the need for counsel in state criminal trials."
Lassiter could lead to a similar result, causing the Court to review
not only the fairness of state procedures, but also the decisions of
state judges. Justice Blackmun, therefore, feared that the Court
might become a "super family court."96
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that
Lassiter was inconsistent with the Court's previous decisions that
established an absolute right to counsel in criminal prosecutions.
He reasoned that a permanent loss of parental rights often may be
a more grievous deprivation of liberty than temporary incarcera-
tion 7 Furthermore, he was shocked by the extent to which the
majority discounted the importance of a parent's interest in main-
taining custody of a child: "[T]he Court appears to treat this case
as though it merely involved the deprivation of an interest in prop-
erty that is less worthy of protection than a person's liberty."98 Be-
cause parental termination proceedings may permanently extin-
guish both liberty and property interests,9 Justice Stevens argued
that the Eldridge factors are inappropriate for evaluating due pro-
cess in these cases. He observed that the Court developed the El-
dridge balancing test for determining the procedures a state must
employ in allocating a limited amount of material resources among
competing claimants. Eldridge is therefore appropriate for weigh-
92. Such challenges may include direct appeals and petitions seeking federal habeas
corpus review. See, e.g., Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980), a/f'd in part, 640 F.2d
599 (5th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en banc).
93. 452 U.S. at 33.
94. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
95. Id. at 51-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 6-14.
96. 452 U.S. at 52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id. A termination hearing may deprive an individual of property rights by extin-
guishing the statutory rights of inheritance. Id.
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ing property interests, but is unsuitable for weighing liberty inter-
ests as valuable as the parent-child relationship. 00
CONCLUSION
Although Lassiter rejected an absolute right to counsel in ter-
mination cases and thus established a precedent applicable to
other civil cases that do not threaten a litigant's physical liberty,
its effect may not be permanent. Lassiter's standard for due pro-
cess analysis is extremely flexible and grants significant discretion
to the trial courts, engendering decisions that will vary unpredict-
ably from one court to another. Moreover, the Court's previous de-
cisions requiring counsel to protect the physical liberty of a crimi-
nal defendant'0 ' are inconsistent with the Lassiter Court's refusal
to provide the same protection to the fundamental rights that exist
between a parent and a child. Lassiter, however, appears analogous
to Betts, in which the Court adopted a flexible approach for crimi-
nal prosecutions, but later rejected it in favor of an absolute right
to counsel. Lassiter's case-by-case analysis may ultimately reach a
similar fate. As an uncounseled litigant's disadvantage increases
with the complexity of both society and the law, Lassiter may il-
lustrate the need for a right to counsel in civil cases more than it
limits this right.
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100. Id. at 59-60. Justice Stevens reasoned that the Constitution requires fundamental
fairness in termination proceedings rather than a balance between the costs and benefits of
requiring the state to provide an attorney for indigent parents.
101. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1979); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
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